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I. E PLURIBUS UNUM? THEORETICAL UNITY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
Americans genuinely seem perplexed by the issue of group rights. Ever
since the Federalists' vision of the country prevailed over the view of those
who saw the nation as congeries of communitarian entities, Americans have
favored the ideal of unitarian nationhood without relinquishing their romance
of community. A similar ambivalence is evident in the American tendency to
cast issues predominantly in terms of individual rights rather than of collective
rights, while still granting exceptions to those groups that seem to embody the
ideals from which we imagine ourselves to have strayed.' Thus, we largely
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1. The classic statement on individualism and the Amencan polity remains that of ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.MiICA (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans.. Harper Pcreamal
1989) (1835). See generally Lawrence Rosen, Individualism, Comnunny, and the Law: A Review E.say.
55 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1988) (reviewing the issues raised by de Tocquevdle. as addressed by more recent
writers).
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speak a language of uniformity-of one body of law affecting all persons in
the same way-yet also acknowledge that religious communities like the
Amish may be destroyed by state-enforced laws of general application.2 We
have long since moved away from a vision of America as a communitarian
polity,3 yet we anguish over the effect that a zoning ordinance has on a local
ethnic community4 or the damage that we do to immigrants when we fail to
consider their backgrounds in criminal proceedings.
The temptation, then, is to seek a unified theory that will speak to
particular situations within a framework of common criteria. Such unifying
theories have broad appeal in many domains of western culture, from religion
to economics to law. The desire for a unifying political and moral theory is
especially strong when indigenous peoples are concerned, since they have long
been left to the mercy of quite different surrounding states. As a result, any
unified theory must account for their particular circumstances.
For the political philosopher Will Kymlicka, the unified frame proposed
is that of the liberal state, a single political entity capable of attending to
multiple cultures within its bounds by recognizing the need of individuals to
forge their choices from within a distinctive cultural orientation.7 Provided that
its citizens all share the larger goal of enabling choices that do not harm
others' capacity for choice, the unity of the state as the guarantor of such
2. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (holding that Amish children who might have
to perform acts contrary to their faith and the well-being of their religious community may not be required
to attend public school beyond the eighth grade). See generally Donald B. Kraybill, Negotiating with
Caesar, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE 3 (Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (describing how the Amish have
used negotiation to maintain their distinctive practices).
3. See PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965) (analyzing the legal and religious
ideas that prompted the American move away from communitarianism and toward a unified system of
politics and law).
4. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. MOORE, AL-MUGHTARIBUN: AMERICAN LAW AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF MUSLIM LI'E IN THE UNITED STATES 117-33 (1995).
5. On the so-called "cultural defense plea," see Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Comment, Cultural Defense:
One Person's Culture Is Another's Crime, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 751 (1987).
6. The disastrous impact of conquest and colonialism on the health, social structure, and political
organization of indigenous peoples has been amply documented, See, e.g., SvEN LINDQVIST, EXTERMINATE
ALL BRUTES (1992) (analyzing the relationship between colonial conquest and the rise of racism in 20th-
century Europe); RONALD WRIGHT, STOLEN CONTINENTS: THE AMERICAS THROUGH INDIAN EYES SINCE
1492 (1992) (describing the effects of disease and depopulation that followed the conquest of the
indigenous peoples of the Americas). The history and conditions of indigenous peoples are addressed In
a number of recent works. See ETHNIcrrY AND GROUP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997);
AUGIE FLERAS & JEAN LEONARD ELLIOTr, 'THE NATIONS WITHIN': ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND NEW ZEALAND (1992); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990); DAVID MAYBURY-LEwIs, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ETHNIC GROUPS, AND
THE STATE (1997); THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995); THE RIGHTS OF
SUBORDINATED PEOPLES (Oliver Mendelsohn & Upendra Baxi eds., 1994); WE ARE HERE: POLITICS OF
ABORIGINAL LAND TENURE (Edwin N. Wilmsen ed., 1989). For the perspectives of a number of indigenous
peoples, see generally THE INDIGENOUS VOICE: VISIONS AND REALITIES (Roger Moody ed., 1988), which
incorporates indigenous accounts of the colonial experience and their views on current conditions; and
VOICES OF THE FIRST NATIONS (Freda Ahenakew ed., 1995), which collects the views of native peoples
of Canada.
7. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
82-84 (1995).
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choice can be maintained.8 For S. James Anaya, a scholar of international law,
unity implicitly lies in the formulation of transnational customs and
conventions.' Their overall principles will insure that national boundaries do
not place undue burdens on the cultural or political life of those who resided
in the state before it took its present political shape." Notwithstanding critical
differences between these two orientations, both authors address many of the
same questions: Is the nation, the cultural group, or humanity as a whole the
proper unit to use in fashioning a comprehensive approach to indigenous
peoples? Is a theory of "multicultural citizenship" or a separate theory of
indigenous rights most likely to produce results consistent with the larger aim
of ensuring individual choice or collective values? Indeed, can any unified
theory adequately address the very different histories and structures of
contemporary indigenous peoples?
Regardless of the shape such a quest for common ground takes in a post-
colonial world, all such theories must take into account the ambivalence that
citizens of many nations feel toward the indigenous peoples living within their
borders." Nowhere are these mixed feelings more striking than in the case
of America's treatment of its own indigenous population. As the image of
8. See id. at 92-93.
9. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996)
10. The movement toward decolonization in the years after World War It also incorporated the "blue
water thesis," which established procedures for granting independence to overseas colonies but largely
immunized states from decolonization procedures affecting their indigenous populations Later
developments, such as the International Labour Organisation conventions. see infra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text, began to erode this exclusively statist position. See ANAYA. supra note 9. at 43-44
11. The term "indigenous" is used in many contexts and documents without precise definition
Kymlicka offers no specific definition, an approach which may call into question his attempt to handle the
problems of all "minorities" within a single frame of analysis. Anaya says "the term indtgenous refers
broadly to the living descendants of preinvasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others " ANAYA.
supra note 9, at 3. Anaya also cites a much longer definition used by the U N Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minonties See id. at 5 n 2 The definitional problem is. of
course, vexing: If identity is left to groups or individuals themselves, as is the practice of the U S census.
more evolving self-definition may result, removing the power of identification from the conqueror It clear
parameters are set, such as degree of native parentage-the blood quantum measure used in much of federal
Indian policy in the past-apparent precision may be acquired at the expense of selt-idcntity and the power
of native groups to set the criteria for their own membership A case like that involving the Mashpee
Indians, in which the question of tribal identity resulted in a finding that the Mashpec were a tribe at certain
times but not at others, shows the difficulties attendant on defining a group by external criteria See
Mashpee Tribe v. New Sudbury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir. 1979). Even overall terminology has
changed. The terms Native American and American Indian now are used interchangeably by most of the
native peoples of the United States (an inconsistency that will be followed here), even though individuals
are careful to identify themselves in most cases by the name of their tnbe. Cf MARIANNA ToRGoVNICK.
PRIMIVE PASSIONS 135-36 (1997) (describing increased self-identification by Native Amencans as Native
Americans).
For purposes of the present discussion, it may therefore be best to work from the broad definitions
used, implicitly and explicitly, by Kymlicka, Anaya, and various international accords Thus, indigenous
peoples may be regarded as the descendants of preinvasion groups who are eligible for membership in and
continue to define themselves in terms of those groups and who continue, in whole or in part. to be
governed by rules formulated by such groups. The specific issues of group attachment, conflicts of laws.
and scope of political powers will vary with each situation, a consequence of indigenous peoples being at
once partially self-governing and irretrievably embedded within a larger polity
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native peoples has changed from that of the noble savage to that of an
indigenous yeomanry, from that of an unproductive nomad to that of a
beleaguered dependent, from that of a worthy foe to that of a sporting mascot
or ecological emblem, Americans have not shaken their ambivalence about
Native Americans and America's treatment of them. When, for example, the
members of the Five Civilized Tribes-notwithstanding their being clothed,
Christianized, and literate-were compelled in the 1830s to remove to the
West, large numbers of Americans signed petitions against their expulsion. 2
Yet white America's unwillingness to back this position with concerted action
bespoke its mixed feelings regarding America's impact on the Native
Americans and their land.' 3 American ambivalence also deeply suffused the
decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall. In his opinions concerning the
Cherokee, 4 Marshall spoke of America's extravagant pretensions in laying
claim to the lands of sovereign peoples and sought to assuage that ambivalence
by creating reciprocal duties for the federal government arising from the Native
Americans' anomalous status as "domestic dependent nations."'5 Through
every twist of policy and every turn of Supreme Court analysis, this
ambivalence has marked America's relations with the original inhabitants of
the land. It remains no less current in decisions today relating to whether a
court should defer to a tribe's discriminatory precepts, 6 deprive a tribe of the
use of an endangered species in an ancient ritual, 7 or accept oral traditions
as valid in the determination of tribal identity.'
What is true in the national realm is increasingly true in the domain of
international law and politics as well. The ambivalence toward group rights,
heightened by decolonization and global awareness of local practices, forces
a wide range of nations and cultures to address such issues as female
circumcision, 9 the capacity of individuals to further themselves despite the
12. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 243 (1962);
see also ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, THE LONG, BrrfER TRAIL: ANDREW JACKSON AND THE INDIANS 67-68
(1993) (describing how Congress was "deluged by hundreds of petitions and memorials, solicited by
religious groups and benevolent societies opposed to Indian removal").
13. See PRUCHA, supra note 12, at 240-44.
14. The Marshall trilogy consists of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Jolmson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
15. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
16. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978) (holding that a federal court civil
action against an Indian tribe for sex discrimination was barred by sovereign immunity).
17. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,746 (1986) (holding that an 1858 treaty with the Yankton
Sioux did not immunize members of the tribe from prosecution for hunting bald eagles without permits
when tribal members regularly used eagle feathers in rituals).
18. The validity and impact of oral testimony is particularly relevant in the process by which American
Indian groups that were previously not recognized by the federal government may achieve government-to-
government status under the terms of the informally designated "Federal Acknowledgment Project." Indeed,
the limited weight given to oral testimony was specifically discussed when the regulations governing this
process were issued. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian
Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 9280, 9289 (1994) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e) (1997)).
19. See Note, What's Culture Got To Do with It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female
Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1946-57 (1993) (detailing the customary and legal implications
[Vol. 107: 227
Indigenous Peoples
conventions of their group, and the rights of individuals to leave the religions
of their birth.20 Numerous international conventions have been propounded,2
but the refusal on the part of the United States and other nations to sign many
of these conventions 22 is less a hypocritical stance toward the principle of
such accords than a manifestation of the deeply equivocal responses such
undertakings elicit.
Given the plenary power that most nations accord themselves to formulate
wholesale solutions to their "native problems," it is understandable that the
quest for a unified theory of group rights should be as attractive a goal to
political philosophers and international lawyers as it is tempting to politicians
and activist courts. In the American context, for example, Congress has
repeatedly used its plenary power to implement one "solution" after another to
"the Indian problem"-from land tenure programs, to support for tribal
constitutions, to the termination of tribal status-all in the belief that the
anomalous status of semi-sovereign entities within national borders could be
comprehensively resolved.23 Courts, too, often have found the peculiar status
of Indians best treated by applying the same standards to tribal members as to
any other citizens in order to avoid having to deal with special circumstances
on a case-by-case basis.
Realistically, however, what might any unified theory do for us? It may
be argued that a universal theory would, without requiring every nation to
solve the relationship of individual to group rights in the same fashion,
encourage the formulation of a common set of terms and standards of
evaluation with which to assess this relationship. Rather like a convertible
currency, such a theory would be capable of transforming general precepts into
localized coin. At the same time, a universal theory would, by its emphasis on
shared terms of conversion, begin to articulate criteria for weighing human
rights, individual rights, and group rights within a single frame of reference.
of female circumcision).
20. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for the nght of individuals to
change their religion. See G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.. art. 18, at 71. 74. U.N. Doc. A/I 0 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Saudi Arabia abstained from voting for the Declarauon in pan because
it regards leaving Islam as an act of apostasy. See DAVID LrrTLE ET AL. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WESTERN AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 33 (1988); ANN
ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS I1 (2d ed. 1995).
21. See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discnmination Based on
Religion or Belief, Nov. 25, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 205 (1982); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1966); International Covenant on Economic. Social. and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1966).
22. For a list of human rights conventions and signatory nations, see Louts HENKIN h1" AL. BASIC
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 143-208 (3d ed 1993)
23. See RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON. THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES
AND POLrTCAL LIBERTY 31-133 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-BasedwndMenbership-Based Wews of indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Courrr Changing Vision, 55 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1 (1993) (discussing the changing
comprehensive views of tribal membership in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court)
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Indeed, it can be argued that such a unified theory might eventually give rise
to shared substantive results: Common practices might come to have the status
of an international customary law of indigenous rights as a greater number of
nations find it advantageous to their international reputations and connections
to give effect to such customs. 25 Even if local solutions were always to
remain preeminent, common approaches could hold out the prospect of more
secure borders, less internal conflict, and greater international
acceptance-provided, of course, that the range of commendable national
solutions was at once limited and politically acceptable.
Why, then, does the formulation of such a unified theory remain so
elusive? There are at least three major hurdles such a theory must overcome.
The first concerns the theory's level of specificity. Imprecise language may
well be as necessary for philosophical theories as for legislative proposals, but
if the range of permissible content remains so great as to permit almost any
practice, neither the theory nor its results will compel respect. Second, the
theory must have a significant degree of transnational applicability. If it
appears to be drawn from or for a particular region, the theory will begin life
with a genealogy that may carry as much advantage in its home territory as it
does stigma abroad. And third, the units upon which the theory is to be built
must be comparable across the board and must be able to stand on
intellectually and politically supportable ground notwithstanding distasteful
local implications. The definition of "indigenous peoples," for example, must
be clear enough that it will not vary widely from one circumstance to another.
Similarly, a unit like "the nation" or "the community" must be drawn with
sufficient precision such that not every collection of individuals would qualify
for its protections; yet the unit must also constitute a rubric under which each
local agglomeration could imagine placing itself. In the process, the question
of whether the same units of analysis apply equally well to such diverse
entities as ethnic groups, minorities, or indigenous peoples will require careful
attention.26
To engage seriously, therefore, the explicit and implicit unified approaches
taken by Kymlicka and Anaya, respectively, is to raise both the question of the
appropriateness to indigenous peoples of any unified approach and the diversity
of concerns that apply to quite different indigenous groups. It is necessary to
25. Cf., e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
(1989) (discussing the emergence and existence of international customary law). But cf. Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849-70 (1997) (questioning whether international human rights lawsuits
are binding under the U.S. Constitution).
26. Numerous other unified theories have, of course, been formulated within political and legal
philosophy. Of particular interest is John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (Stephen
Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993), which argues that justice requires equal political opportunities, equal
economic opportunities, and maximum benefit to the disadvantaged. For a critique of Rawls's position, see
Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 195 (1994).
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tack back and forth between broad theory and specific cases as a check on the
viability of the theory and the effects of theory on practice. Part II of this
Review, then, considers Kymlicka's theory of the liberal state as a way of
engaging the problems of indigenous peoples, like those of other minority
groups, within a single framework of analysis. Part III evaluates Anaya's
chosen framework of international rights conventions to see how that particular
unifying approach deals with the distinctive situation of native populations.
The final part of this Review returns to the overall advisability of relying on
a unified approach given both the particularities of indigenous situations and
some of the proposals and practices that have been developed outside the
framework of a unified theory.
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN A MULTICULTURAL STATE
Although he does not refer to it as a unified theory, Will Kymlicka seeks
a single, overarching theory that encompasses all minority groups, including
conquered indigenous peoples. He finds in classic liberal political theory the
basis for such an approach. In his version of liberalism, individuals must live
within sociocultural groups in order to express and enact their political lives.
States must afford such groups, whether they are constituted by immigrants or
people native to the land, the opportunity to exist. If, however, any of these
subnational groups fail to grant their own members that degree of personal
choice that the state accords each person, then in the hierarchy of powers
engendered by the liberal deference to the individual, subsidiary cultures must
give way. Thus, to understand Kymlicka's unified approach, one must
understand both the tenets and the limits of his version of the liberal state.
As the subtitle of Kymlicka's book indicates, his unified theory is intended
to cover a wide variety of minority groups, not only indigenous peoples, and
to do so from the perspective of the theory of liberalism articulated by such
authors as John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin,2' whose works
are within the classic liberal tradition expressed centuries before by John
Locke. Kymlicka notes that in the period since World War II adherents to this
form of liberalism have emphasized broad-scale human rights, as embodied in
such documents as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.' With the exception of some affirmative action programs, however,
even liberals have largely turned away from an emphasis on the collective
rights of minorities.2 9 While an emphasis on ethnic minorities in the first half
of the century had seemed to contribute to the divisiveness that led to war,
27. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 80-82.
28. See id. at 2-5 (citing Universal Declaration. supra note 20, at 71). The Universal Dcclaraton was
adopted with 48 states voting in favor, none against, and eight abstaining (including Saudi Arabia. the
USSR, South Africa, and Yugoslavia). See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 22. at 143
29. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 4.
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failure to attend to these groups' claims in more recent years, says Kymlicka,
has left "cultural minorities vulnerable to significant injustice,"'3 particularly
with respect to the preservation of their cultures through language, education,
and the exercise of some degree of communal power. Thus, human rights
conventions, which "are quite vague, and often seem motivated more by the
need to appease belligerent minorities than by any clear sense of what justice
requires,"'" need to be supplemented by a more comprehensive theory of
minority rights.32
Toward this end, the author characterizes a state as multinational if it
contains a number of groups whose strong distinctions of language and culture
are rooted in originating nation-like entities, or as polyethnic if the state
consists of groups that, notwithstanding their national origins, seek by their
immigrant status to become part of the larger society.33 Thus, countries like
Australia, New Zealand, and some in Latin America, all of which have tried
to merge their indigenous peoples into the polyethnic category and to claim
immunity from international scrutiny, would be required to conceive of their
native peoples as part of a multinational state. The result of this
recategorization is crucial because under Kymlicka's general theory rights flow
differently depending on the category that applies.34 Since liberalism is not
simply about individual rights but also is about the protection of freedom of
conscience-which in most instances can be fulfilled only through group
activities protected by an appropriate measure of self-governance-justice, says
the author, requires some degree of "group-differentiated citizenship."35 This
ranges from an entitlement to the preservation of one's language and
background, in the case of the units comprising a polyethnic state, to a fuller
set of self-governing powers, for the units composing a multinational nation.36
To specify how these rights should be assessed and apportioned, the author has
to involve himself still more directly with the implications of his liberal theory.
For Kymlicka, liberalism implies the freedom to choose a plan for one's
life, and to do so by rationally assessing the idea of the good in the face of
new information or experiences.37 Such choices can exist only within the
context of group life. He therefore agrees with Ronald Dworkin that by
debasing one's culture the range of desirable choice is itself debased. 38 A
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 10-11, 17-19.
34. See id. at 26-33.
35. Id. at 47-48.
36. See id. at 45-46.
37. Kymlicka speaks of liberal tolerance as committed to that form of autonomy by which "individuals
should be free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends." Id. at 158.
38. See id. at 83 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 230 (1985)). For a critical
discussion of Kymlicka's ideas concerning the harm occasioned by the loss of one's culture, see John R.
Danley, Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and Cultural Minorities, 20 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 168, 179-80 (1991).
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culture provides an ease of identity-what Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz
have called "boundaries of the imaginable"39-which, though it could be
surrendered at will, is rarely forsaken because of the difficulty any individual
would have in starting from scratch to compose a range of available life
plans." But whereas communitarians see the highly localized as the level at
which ends should be reinforced and choices made possible, Kymlicka posits
the nation-state itself as the fundamental unit within which any kind of
minority group can offer choices to its members.4
It is here that Kymlicka runs into the first of a number of stumbling
blocks.4" Like any comprehensive approach, a theory of group rights based
on a vision of the liberal state must address specific situations and
differentiate, where appropriate, among the variants covered by a single
formula. If, for example, minorities who emigrated to a new country and those
already resident there are to be treated identically or according to a hierarchy
of importance, the unifying theory must account for the merging or ranking of
constituent entities. Neither in philosophy nor in physics is it plausible to offer
a comprehensive approach that grants any particular element priority without
a clear rationale for doing so; neither in politics nor in science may one
discount inconvenient differences or merge entities to fit one's formula.
In addition, one must be clear about the units of one's analysis. If the
chosen building block produces insights for one issue but not for others, its
claims to comprehensive usefulness will be undermined. If the unit chosen is
itself capable of being broken down into separate elements, one's theory must
account for the circumstances in which one or another level of inclusiveness
is appropriate. And if, as in physics, psychology, or astronomy, one's political
theory is intended to show the natural or logical relation among domains not
previously seen as linked, the new paradigm must show that such connections
apply across a wide-indeed, all-encompassing-set of discrete cases. It is
39. Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Detennination, 87 J. PHIL 439. 449 (1990)
40. See KYMLiCKA, supra note 7, at 89-90 (discussing how cultural identiues provide meaningful
options to the members of a culture).
41. See id. at 93.
42. In an earlier study, Kymlicka had argued that cultural disadvantage is equivalent to material
disadvantage, see WILL KYMUCKA, LBERALISM. COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 183-87. 193-95 (1989). and
that a liberal state owes consideration to minorities for their cultural needs, as a context for choice, no less
than to all its citizens for their material needs, see id. at 165-66. This left open, however, the issue of
whether a community whose customs are contrary to those of the liberal concept of justice has a claim to
such cultural consideration. The book under review is. in part, an answer to some of the cnuctsms raised
about that earlier work. Kymlicka's edited volume, THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES. supra note 6.
contains a series of essays, including one by Anaya. See S. James Anaya. The Capacity of International
Law To Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES. supra note
6, at 321. The essays address minority rights issues through particular regional and topical examples. Of
special interest is the exchange between Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Kukathas's reprinted 1992
article, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, see Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, in THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 6, at 228, which argues that liberalism should support
individual but not group rights, was answered by Kymlicka in Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority
Cultures: Reply to Kukathas, 20 POL. THEORY 140 (1992).
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precisely on these criteria that Kymlicka's approach begins to encounter
difficulties.
Kymlicka chooses the nation-state both as the irreducible unit for a culture
(as the context for supplying possible choices) and as the building block for
either multinational or polyethnic citizenship.43 This decision precludes
consideration of those other units within which people frequently find
meaningful life rendered possible." One cannot assume that it is only within
the broader context of a state that the freedom of choice Kymlicka takes as
axiomatic must be embedded.
Kymlicka's starting point, it is important to note, is almost always his
native Canada, where he has served in both advisory and academic roles.43
The question of Quebec thus forms his central example, and when he moves
by extension to Puerto Rico or to the role of indigenous groups generally it is
against the problem of Canadian unity that he posits his units of analysis and
his preferred solutions.4 6 It is thus never clear why people should not be free
to choose the unit they think best expresses their freedoms-why, indeed, that
is not among the freedoms even liberal theory should acknowledge-and why
association needs to be placed within a larger nation to be either meaningful
or viable.47
The problem goes deeper inasmuch as Kymlicka and arguments he cites
favorably envision culture as an admixture of elements-rather like a
wardrobe, a collection of books, or a set of favored cuisines-that each person
puts together for himself.4" Were he instead to see culture as a set of
categories by which experience is rendered meaningful and made to seem
immanent and indeed even natural, by its connections and replications in
diverse domains of life, 9 the presumption in favor of the state as the atom
43. In Kymlicka's lexicon, culture and nation are to be equated: "I am using 'a culture' as synonymous
with 'a nation' or 'a people'-that is, as an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally
complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history." KYMLICKA,
supra note 7, at 18.
44. Kymlicka's definition, for example, allows him to avoid raising "gay culture" or similar groupings
to the level of entitlement his theory propounds. By equating culture and national borders, however, his
schema fails to incorporate native groups that have been dispersed across jurisdictional frontiers, to whom
Kymlicka's own criteria for a protectible culture should apply.
45. See Brian Barry, Book Review, 107 ETHICS 153, 153 (1996) (reviewing KYMLICKA, supra note
7). Kymlicka's fellow Canadian Charles Taylor also says: "It is not altogether an accident that this book
was written by a Canadian." Charles Taylor, Book Review, 90 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 408, 408 (1996)
(reviewing KYMLICKA, supra note 7).
46. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 79, 122, 142.
47. Brian Barry is especially critical of this emphasis in Kymlicka's book: "[Wlhen it comes to a
choice between individual autonomy and almost unconditional collective autonomy for national minorities,
Kymlicka comes down unhesitatingly on the side of the latter. Nothing could show more clearly the
subversion of Kymlicka's original liberal project by his subscription to the doctrines of romantic
nationalism." Barry, supra note 45, at 154.
48. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 101-03 (citing Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the
Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751 (1992)).




of choice would not withstand inspection. Some of the problems used by
Kymlicka to exemplify his theory and some of his solutions would similarly
be called into question.
Consider, for example, the problem posed by the illiberal society.
Kymlicka says that while justice demands the freedom of choice within one's
nation-like culture, this is only true if that culture itself allows change through
choice among new experiences or information.50 Thus, he suggests, a society
that refuses to allow women to have the full range of choice allowed men is
not entitled to the full measure of acceptance within a multicultural state since
it fails the initial test of liberal freedom for all its members." It is here that
a second stumbling block interposes itself, for Kymlicka, despite his occasional
denials, 52 also sees the individual as the fundamental unit operating within a
nation-like entity to create his or her own choices."' Illiberal groupings fail
to acknowledge individual rights. This is so whether the grouping is a tribe
that does not allow the children of women who marry outsiders to inherit tribal
positions or properties in the same way as men who marry outsider women,5
or the Ottoman millet system, which allowed confessional autonomy over
personal matters but granted no realistic escape for those who lacked full
benefits within a recognized religious community.55 But removing formal
constraints is no guarantee that freedom is enhanced: It is a hard question
whether one is ever entirely free to ignore the categories by which one's
culture creates a sense of orderliness. And even if one does shift cultures, has
one increased freedom or merely exchanged modes of constraint? Is a Native
American who leaves his group more free than one who accepts the constraints
of inclusion notwithstanding some reduction of choice?
Kymlicka is hardly unaware of such problematic issues, but he continually
ducks the hard questions by suggesting that where irreconcilable differences
exist some modus vivendi should be sought 6 or by axiomatically reasserting
the freedom to revise one's choices,57 without indicating how we are to know
when such freedom is actually being exercised. Although he does not counsel
direct intervention in an illiberal society, particularly if people are free to leave
50. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 158. 165-72. Compare Kymlicka's argument with that of Daniel
Philpott, who argues that the enhancement of democracy should be the purpose of recognizing self-
determination in a group. See Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self.Detenmnanon. 105 ETHics 352, 375-76
(1995).
51. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7. at 3942, 132-34
52. See id. at 46-47, 127, 129.
53. See id. at 92-93.
54. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S 49 (1978). Lovelace v Canada. U N GAOR Hum
Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 18, at 166. U N Doc A4/36f40 (1977). repnnted in 2 Ht!t
RTS. L.J. 158 (1981).
55. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 156-58 (discussing the Ottoman millet system)
56. One approach the author suggests is that of granting such groups an exemption from national laws
See id. at 168.
57. See id. at 158 (discussing the importance of freedom to assess and revise one's ends as cntical to
liberalism).
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or if their leaders have broad popular support,58 neither these social
characteristics nor his assertion that economic pressure is permissible to bring
down an illiberal society5 9 tells us why one form of force is allowed when
another is not. Indeed, it becomes impossible to tell where the line is between
a serious restriction like slavery and an arguably less serious one like exclusion
by gender from certain rituals.60 Kymlicka is ultimately forced to conclude
that "[1]iberals need to think more deeply about how to promote the
liberalization of societal cultures" 6' without ever having come to grips with
any other unit of existence or any other criterion for freedom than his own
simplified, and rather incoherent, theory of rational choice within the nation-
state.
Just as toleration, by this theory, means relative nonintervention except to
encourage individual choice within cultural contexts, so too citizenship, by
these lights, does not contradict polyethnic rights. This is true so long as
identities can to some degree be shared, even if that means forgetting a certain
amount of intergroup history. Kymlicka admits to being mystified at the
process by which (as he quotes A.V. Dicey) "a very peculiar state of
sentiment" arises to precipitate a shared identity.62 His mystification,
however, may arise from the fact that, more often than not, shared identity
develops out of highly illiberal processes-by distinguishing "us" from "them,"
by castigating "them" as less than "us," and by taking actions that commit
oneself to such a view of others." If Kymlicka is to fashion a truly unified
theory of group rights he must ask, at the very least, whether the very
"illiberal" tendencies he would wish to see destroyed do not, in fact, yield
desirable ends in themselves. If that is so, just what criteria will stand up to
universal inspection as "illiberal"?
Perhaps, one might argue, it is sufficient to guard both the merits of
personal choice and resultant shared identity simply by protecting constitutional
freedoms of religion, association, and the like. Here again the Canadian
example is Kymlicka's starting point-and in many respects his limiting point
as well. For even though he does not want the language issue pushed back to
the highly localized level, he still would support land claims for territorial
groups-not as compensation, but "to sustain the viability of self-governing
58. See id. at 165-70.
59. See id. at 168-69 (distinguishing direct intervention from incentives to improve human rights such
as offering membership in the European Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement).
60. See id. at 170 (arguing that the Amish, Mennonites, and Hasidic Jews present more complex cases
for intervention).
61. Id. at 172.
62. Id. at 192 (quoting, without citation, the 19th-century English theorist A.V. Dicey's discussion of
multinational federations).
63. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, for example, demonstrates the positive correlation of utopian communities'
hostility to the outside world with their stability and longevity. See ROSABETH Moss KANTER,
COMMITMENT AND COMMUNITY: COMMUNES AND UTOPIAS IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1972).
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minority communities." Without specifying which instances merit such
support, Kymlicka offers no way to discriminate among the actual cases that
arise.
Does, for example, teaching Ebonics (an alleged African-American
language dialect)65 as the first language in an elementary school qualify for
state toleration? If, under Kymlicka's theory, one answers in the negative
because African Americans are not a nation-like culture and they seek
integration into American society at large, one presumes what many African
Americans themselves may not assert. If one argues in favor of self-
government for native peoples without specifying the limits of sovereignty-in
the sense, as the United States Supreme Court once characterized it, of the
ability "to make their own laws and be ruled by them"--one's theory
remains altogether inapplicable to concrete situations. If one does not specify
criteria for determining when "assimilation" is so complete as to eradicate
cultural distinctiveness, one cannot determine which rights to accord various
groups. And if all that can be offered, by Kymlicka's own admission, is "a
rather vague conclusion" 67 that setting aside some seats for representatives of
native peoples in the national legislature is desirable," a good deal of the
force of one's theories must of necessity be lost. To paraphrase the famous
words of John Gardner, if we do not think any more concretely about how we
construct our philosophy than how we construct our plumbing, we run the risk
that neither will hold water.69
It is for this reason that one regrets the absence of more developed
examples in Kymlicka's work.70 Consider, for instance, the impact of the
following cases for Kymlicka's theory: In 1988, Ivan Kitok, a member of the
Scandinavian native group known as the Sami, was denied the right to herd
reindeer by the village to which he had formerly belonged.7 ' His exclusion
was upheld by the Regeringstrtten (the highest administrative court in
Sweden) under Swedish law, which grants considerable autonomy to the Sami
on such matters.72 When Kitok appealed to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, alleging the violation of his right to enjoy his own culture, the
Committee upheld the Swedish ruling, stating that the interests of the group
64. KYMuCKA, supra note 7. at 220 n.5.
65. See Peter Applebome, "Ebonics' Omitted in Oakland Report on Teacung Enghlih, N Y Tt.ts.
May 6, 1997, at 19.
66. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1958).
67. KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 150.
68. See id. at 144-49.
69. Cf. JOHN GARDNER, EXCELLENCE 86 (1961) ("The society that scoms excellence in plumbing
because it is a humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an exalied activity will
have neither good plumbing nor good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water )
70. Specific examples of the conflict between individual and group nghts are analyzed in I AN-hOy
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL REALrTY 309-85 (1995).
71. See Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.. 43d Sess., Supp No 40. Annex 7(G). at
221, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (views adopted July 27. 1988).
72. See id. at 222.
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could, in instances like the control of collective resources, sometimes outweigh
the interests of an individual.7 Kymlicka's rather weak response to the
similar case of Lovelace v. Canada74 is that the powerful should not be
allowed to exploit the weak.75 But this does not address the question of how
a theory of individual rights as choice enhancement within a group culture
should lead us to assess the group's need to maintain a coherent world view
and form of organization. Similarly, consider the case of David Thomas, a
Coast Salish Indian who was taken against his will to undergo an initiation
ceremony experienced by all Salish men.76 Kymicka's theory fails to guide
us to a decision as to whether Salish or Canadian culture should be supported
in such a case--especially given the fact that Canadian culture itself can
require service against one's will in the military.
Perhaps Kymlicka is right when he says that such issues cannot be
resolved, only managed, and that reducing issues to individual rights alone may
disrupt the formation of a viable polity.77 Yet if the author did not find that
principle to be applicable when a society was being "illiberal" to one of its
own members, even this back-up position loses much of its persuasive force.
The problem may, as we shall see, lie less in some of the universals to which
Kymlicka commends our assent than in the very quest for a unified theory
linking such disparate phenomena. Before addressing that prospect, however,
we must consider one other major alternative approach, namely that of an
international law of indigenous rights.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A UNIFYING FRAME
S. James Anaya's belief in the utility of international law for framing the
discussion of indigenous rights is axiomatic to his study: He accepts without
question international accords as the-or at least an-indispensable element
in addressing and assuring whatever rights ought to be accorded conquered
peoples. Anaya lays no explicit claim to the formulation of a unified theory of
minority or indigenous rights. Nevertheless, his reliance on the fundamental
precepts of international law and on its superiority in addressing these issues
indicates his commitment to the principles of international law as such a
73. See id. at 229. See generally Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1991)
(describing the relationships between resource management, individual rights, and collective rights in
indigenous communities).
74. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 18, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40
(1977), reprinted in 2 HUM. RTs. L.J. 158 (1981).
75. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 230 n.l. Compare Kymlicka's treatment of Lovelace to the brief
review of it and Kitok in ANAYA, supra note 9, at 101. Anaya argues that Kitok demonstrates that group
interests in cultural survival may take priority over individual rights. See id.
76. See Thomas v. Norris [19921 2 C.N.L.R. 139 (B.C. Sup. Ct.); see also Patrick Macklem,
Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1343 (1993)
(analyzing Thomas in terms of tribal sovereignty).
77. See KYMLICKA, supra note 7, at 193-94.
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unifying framework. Unlike Kymlicka, he factors indigenous peoples out for
separate consideration. His international law approach thus presumes: (1) that
the discussion of indigenous rights and needs takes place most fruitfully across
national frontiers; (2) that through such cross-national boundaries standards can
develop that each state cannot, as history shows, be relied upon to achieve on
its own; and (3) that once articulated, such rights, though far from self-
executing, will gain force through accepted methods of international law
practice. In this regard, he takes as given that international articulation of
indigenous rights is a good thing in and of itself in much the same way that
Kymlicka assumes the nation is the best unit within which even group-
differentiated rights can be fashioned. To understand Anaya's unified approach,
therefore, one must initially understand the antecedents of his form of
international law discourse.78
Anaya organizes his study into three distinct parts. First, he details the
historical context of the modem human rights movement.79 By doing so, he
is able to show how western expansionism enfolded native peoples within an
international law framework that rendered the state central and all competing
claims for sovereignty not rising to the level of the state largely unworthy of
full recognition. As contemporary international norms began to emerge after
World War II, Anaya argues in the second part of his study, the concept of
self-determination took center stage; with it followed an intense discussion
about the content of such a concept and its range of application.' Anaya's
focus in the third part of his study-the actual implementation of international
norms 8 '-flows directly from his earlier chapters. By reviewing various
international accords within the context of negotiated international conventions,
he is able to place the existing and proposed conventions affecting indigenous
peoples in a broader context. Throughout, Anaya does not propound a specific
theory of indigenous rights but instead situates himself firmly in the context
of international law; his study partakes of, and adds to, the assumptions that
drive much of international law discourse, particularly the emphasis on the
state and the individual as the sole units for consideration.
Anaya strives to show that international law provides an especially
appropriate, if implicit, framework in which to address the rights of indigenous
peoples. Like the proponents of international conventions of human rights, he
comes to the unifying appeal of international law through a particular history
of ideas and political relations. As Anaya himself describes it, if the language
78. Anaya explored many of the issues addressed in the prcscni book in his earier work See S James
Anaya, A Contemporary Definition of the International Nonn of Self-Detertinaton. 3 TRA. NSN,' I. L &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (1993); S. James Anaya, Native Land Clants n the Unted States The Unatoned
for Spirit of Place, in THE CAMBRIDGE LEcTURES, 1991. at 25 (Frank McArdil ed. 1993)
79. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 9-71.
80. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 75-125.
81. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 129-82.
19971
The Yale Law Journal
of much philosophical discourse about group rights is firmly embedded in the
terms of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal or communitarian thought,
the language of international group rights is only now beginning to emerge
from the concepts of international law born in that same age. 2 Philosophy
and law in the early modem era, he indicates, shared a bias in favor of the
state as the essential unit of analysis.8 3 Thus, in the formulation of the leading
eighteenth-century theoretician of international law, Emmerich de Vattel, the
dichotomy between individual and nation-state was posited as a natural fact."
Native peoples, with their overlapping territories and kin-based affiliations,
qualified as neither. Notwithstanding some variations, Vattel's characterizations
captured the terms of discussion. The conclusion that the law of nations existed
between states, rather than above them, reinforced the qualification that states
achieve their status only if recognized by other states. Well into the twentieth
century, therefore, native tribes were said to have no status whatsoever in
international law.
5
Anaya explains that in the period of decolonization after World War II
international organizations paid increasing attention to the circumstances of the
native peoples of the newly independent nations of the world. 6 Although the
problems of native peoples were once regarded as the sole province of
conquering nations, the development of some states out of former mandatory
or trust territories under international law, coupled with an overall anti-racist
climate, increased the visibility of native peoples to international agencies.
Mutually recognizing states were no longer the only units of discussion in
international fora: Human rights and group rights constituted an alternative
discourse to which many agencies became increasingly attuned. As Anaya
indicates, indigenous peoples first began to benefit from this shift when, in
1957, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) promulgated Convention
No. 107. 87 Although the attention to natives was new, the underlying
82. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 13-15.
83. See id.
84. See EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758).
85. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 23. As Anaya summarizes the matter: "Early affirmations of
indigenous peoples' rights succumbed to a state-centered Eurocentric system that could not accommodate
indigenous peoples and their cultures as equals." Id. at 26. Thus, in Advisory Opinion No. 61, Western
Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16), the fact that Spain had agreements with the chiefs of local tribes was
taken to mean that the area was not terra nullius. In Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829
(1928), however, the Netherlands was permitted to assert sovereignty by right of occupation
notwithstanding the argument that the natives were as politically and socially organized as the natives in
the Western Sahara. In each instance, the Eurocentric conception of state and polity governed the
assessment of the case. See generally KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIOINAL TrrLE (1989) (analyzing
claims to native lands in the development of the British colonial empire). For the argument that the precepts
governing western legal approaches to indigenous peoples derives from propositions established during the
Medieval period, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMs, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WEsTERN LEOAL THOUOHT 49-50
(1990).
86. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 43-44.
87. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 44 (discussing and citing Convention (No. 107) Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
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philosophy was not: The Convention spoke in terms of members of indigenous
"populations" rather than of "peoples" or "groups," and the overall tone was
assimilationist.88 It took until 1989 before a new version of the ILO
Convention was to reflect changing perceptions through its elimination of an
incorporative tone,' 9 and its emphasis on the more independent sounding
"peoples." 9 The ILO experience is important not only for coping with the
loaded terminology of indigenous rights but also because, unlike other
organizations, the ILO creates treaty obligations among ratifying states and
affects the formation of those precepts of international customary law that
compel recognition.9
The experience of the ILO thus becomes a test of Anaya's faith in
international accords, of the movement from an assimilationist to an
indigenous-rights perspective, and of the level of specificity any such
international accord must achieve to be effective. But the ILO conventions still
did not test the full extent to which native voices and concerns could affect the
shape of these conventions. A stronger test for Anaya's international law
approach relates to the concept of "self-determination" as addressed in more
recent international conventions. Not unexpectedly, many nations have been
adamant in wishing to avoid the imputation that native groups possess a right
to a significant degree of self-governance or even secession.92 Thus, when the
United Nations formed a working group in 1985 to formulate the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the stage was set for a
substantial divergence of views. Many nations objected to the implication of
separatism contained in the term self-determination, while most groups
representing indigenous peoples insisted on the use of the term.93 (Ironically,
the United States has not objected to the term or many of its underlying
implications, in part because American policy with respect to Native
Americans since the 1970s has been repeatedly referred to as the "Self-
Determination Policy.")94 To understand some of the reasons the U.N.
Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247). Convention No. 107 was motivated by the ILO's concern
about employment practices adversely affecting native peoples.
88. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 45.
89. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Counties. June 27.
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382. Anaya calls this Convention *'international law's most concrete manifestation of the
growing responsiveness to indigenous peoples' demands." ANAYA. supra note 9, at 47
90. ANAYA, supra note 9, at 48.
91. See id. at 49-50.
92. The ILO Convention No. 169, for example, ducked the issue altogether As the committee whose
proceedings led to the Convention wrote: "'[Tlhc use of the term -peoples" in this Convention has no
implications as regards the right to self-determination as understood in international law "" ANAYA. supra
note 9, at 49 (quoting Report of the Committee on Convention 107. International Labour Conference.
Provisional Record 25, 76th Ses., at 25-27, para. 31 (1989)).
93. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 49.
94. The term (as well as the clearest articulation of this approach) is utilized in RiICARD NixoN.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNrrED STATES TPANSMIrTTNo RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN
POLICY, H.R. DOC. No. 91-363, at 3 (1970), reprinted in DAVID H. GETCHES Er AL. FEDERAL LMIAN
LAW 253 (3d ed. 1993). More recently, the U.S. Congress acknowledged "the deprivation of the rights of
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Working Group has not succeeded yet in forwarding a draft for approval, and
indeed to test how good the international law framework propounded by Anaya
is in incorporating indigenous perspectives, it is worthwhile to review some of
the outstanding issues and differences of opinion that can be used to
supplement Anaya's account.
The central problem in international accords affecting native groups, as we
shall see, concerns the extent to which they assure some degree of self-rule.
Settling on the terminology to address this issue in highly divergent situations
has been a major stumbling block. Similarly, the question of inclusion within
the rubric of "indigenous" has posed its own problems: Should some form of
political or social association be a defining feature, or should heritage, self-
definition, or national law hold sway? At what stage may a group or individual
have so merged with the larger society or polity that it may be said effectively
to have relinquished its former affiliation? And when differences of approach
or interpretation arise, will some pan-national forum be called upon to decide
the matter-and, if so, by what criteria-or should matters be left to the parties
to negotiate, notwithstanding substantial differences in bargaining power?
Views on these and related issues vary immensely.
If we compare the current version of the Declaration with earlier drafts and
with revisions proposed by the National Aboriginal Islander Legal Services
Secretariat (NAILSS),95 one of the many indigenous nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) given consultative status in the proceedings, some very
sharp differences are apparent. An early draft of the Declaration spoke of the
concern that oppressed native peoples should be empowered "to voice their
grievances and to organize themselves in order to bring an end to all forms of
discrimination and oppression which they face."96 NAILSS wanted the
declaration to speak of the conditions of deprivation and disintegration "which
Native Americans to self-determination" in its apology for "the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of
the Native American people" by "the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893."
SJ. Res. 19, 103d Cong. § 1 (1993). Self-determination legislation, such as the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994), has permitted Indian tribes to plan and
administer programs funded by the federal government. Part of the irony of the American policy is captured
by David Maybury-Lewis, who has noted the fact that the colonists labeled the natives of the New World
Indians, only to try to abolish the term later. See MAYBURY-LEWIS, supra note 6, at 7-12.
95. See Statement by the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services Secretariat (Chippendale)
[hereinafter NAILSS Statement] (on file with the Yale Law Journal). Anaya does not refer to the NAILSS
statement or to those of similar groups in his text. For a set of responses by other NGOs to an early draft
declaration, see Jason W. Clay, Organizing To Survive, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Winter 1984, at 2; and
Roger Jones, Legal Strategies for Cultural Survival and Human Rights, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Spring
1986, at 69. See also the discussions by indigenous and governmental representatives in UNITED NATIONS,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6 (1982); and
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS ON ITS
SEVENTH SESSION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 REPORT].
96. 1989 REPORT, supra note 95, at 31.
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The present draft of the Declaration speaks instead of indigenous peoples'
"right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests.'
'9
Similarly, an earlier draft spoke of "the need for minimum standards taking
account of the diverse realities of indigenous peoples in all parts of the
world." 99 NAILSS would have substituted "comprehensive" for "minimum"
standards."l° By comparison, the current draft simply speaks of the United
Nations' having "an important and continuing role to play in promoting and
protecting the rights of indigenous peoples."' 0 ' Indigenous NGOs did succeed
in changing the 1988 draft language barring "propaganda derogating their
dignity and diversity"; 10 2 the current draft refers instead to "[a]ny form of
propaganda directed against them."'
0 3
NAILSS, however, pressed for "recognition of and protection for
[indigenous peoples'] own self-defined land-tenure systems.""° Whether the
current reference in Article 26 to "the full recognition of their laws, traditions
and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and
management of resources"' 05 will carry the same implications for protecting
indigenous concepts of land tenure remains to be seen. Although the current
draft repeatedly speaks of the right to self-determfination-particularly in its
clear assertion in Article 3 that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right of self-
determination"---the matter is far from being acceptable to many member
states. Indeed, indigenous representatives walked out of the October 22, 1996,
meeting of the Working Group to protest an agenda that, after twelve years of
haggling, would have reopened discussion of every one of the draft
provisions.'0 7 Representatives of native groups reportedly were trying to
determine if Article 3 has any real chance of passage or whether its denial by
many states will undermine the entire thrust of the document."
97. NAILSS Statement, supra note 95, at I (footnote omitted)
98. U.N. DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES. AS AGREED UPON BY THE
MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS AT ITS EIvENTH SEssIoN (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION). reprinted in CULTURAL SURVIVAL. Q. Spring 1994. at 65 The
1988 draft did incorporate in its preamble the phrase "which in turn may lead to rebellion against all forms
of oppression," but very pointedly left out the word "legitmately" from any reference to conditions leading
to rebellion, as proposed by various NGOs. UNITED NATIONS. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIl..
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS REPORT oF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS ON ITS SIXTH SESSiON 32, U N Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 DRAFT DECLARATIONI
99. 1988 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 32
100. NAILSS Statement, supra note 95, at 2 (footnote omitted)
101. 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 65
102. 1988 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 33
103. 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98. at 66.
104. NAILSS Statement, supra note 95, at 4 (footnote omitted)
105. 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 67
106. Id. at 66.
107. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenoua Peoples Update. CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q.
Winter 1997, at 5.
108. See id.
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Anaya's approach to self-determination parallels the intent and the
incompleteness of documents like the Draft Declaration. He sees "the plain
meaning" of the term "peoples," not as support for the proliferation of
mutually exclusive entities, but as bespeaking a global context of increasingly
interconnected and interdependent spheres of power."° Secessionism is
trumped by the propulsion toward such interconnectedness, which he equates
even with the real meaning of freedom."t But this is surely a very different
notion from that held by many indigenous groups. Many of these groups want
true self-governance to the exclusion of any other polity; many do not want
citizenship imposed upon them by states within which they happen to live;"'
and many hold the belief that land is not convertible into money,"2 a belief
that may be utterly incompatible with the economies of the surrounding state.
Anaya is more sensitive than Kymlicka to the range of ways in which the
relations among indigenous and state governments may be organized,
negotiated, and revised,"' but he does share with Kymlicka the assumption
that it is through law, more than through politics, that all such relationships
should be cast.
Similarly, Anaya sees the implementation of self-determination supported
by the extension of the concept of international customary law into the realm
of indigenous rights. Thus, a notion like cultural integrity, which appears in
Article 6 of the Draft Declaration," 4 has been applied by international fora
to cases that involve state interference with access to and management of
native resources."' But more difficult cases involving women" 6 and
109. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 80-82.
110. See id. at 79. Anaya writes:
The values of freedom and equality implicit in the concept of self-determination have meaning
for the multiple and overlapping spheres of human association and political ordering that
characterize humanity. Properly understood, the principle of self-determination, commensurate
with the values it incorporates, benefits groups--that is, "peoples" in the ordinary sense of the
term--throughout the spectrum of humanity's complex web of interrelationships and loyalties,
and not just peoples defined by existing or perceived sovereign boundaries.
Id.
111. See 2 THE INDIGENOUS VoIcE 1-174 (Roger Moody ed., 1988) (containing numerous statements
by indigenous groups on their desire for autonomy and self-governance).
112. See lid. at 355-410 (containing native peoples' statements concerning the inalienability of native
lands).
113. Cf. 2 id. at 129-40 (detailing negotiations involving Australian aborigines and Maoris with the
governments of Australia and New Zealand, respectively).
114. See 1993 DRAFt DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 66.
115. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 100-01 (citing cases). Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368, 368 (1967), also speaks of the right of minorities "to enjoy [their]
own culture," though it does not use the term "integrity." Anaya details other international documents that
refer to cultural integrity. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 98-104.
116. The present Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, unlike earlier versions, makes
no special mention of women's rights. References to other U.N. conventions in the Declaration do not
resolve the question whether traditions of gender discrimination within an indigenous community will take
precedence over national or international guarantees couched in terms of individual or human rights. The
question of women's rights is one of the stumbling blocks to wide acceptance of human rights standards.
The broader conflict of cultural values and international norms has created difficulties in formulating
international standards. For example, there was considerable disagreement over these issues at the World
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children" 17 in indigenous societies will cast a very different light on the idea
of "cultural integrity" and the relation of collective rights under indigenous
rights agreements to individual rights as understood by human rights
conventions.
Indeed, Anaya's account can be read to suggest that it is perhaps more in
the realm of material issues than in deep-seated cultural difference that
international conventions can serve indigenous peoples most effectively.
Protection of the intellectual property of native peoples-their designs,
medicinal discoveries, and genetic resources-is potentially amenable to
international accords" 8 and has already found its way into some of the
policies and practices of the World Bank and private investment" '
Particularly troublesome are the conflicts that arise when native peoples and
the state disagree on the exploitation of resources in their territories. These
may range from the state's perceived "need" to extract minerals or energy from
a native territory '2 to the state's desire to bar the killing of endangered
Conference on Human Rights, held in June 1993, in Vienna. and at the preparatory meeting resulting in
the Bangkok Declaration of the Ministers and Representatives of Asian States See The Bangkok
Declaration, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUE-S 205. 216-19 (Michael C Dais ed. 1995)
(advocating the accommodation of national and regional particularities and varying historical, cultural, and
religious backgrounds in the process of international noml-setting). Michael Davis. Clunese Perspecn es
on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra. at 3 (noting the Asian governments,
position that the concept of "universal standards" for the protection of human rights is "'undesirable. it not
impossible"); James Ledbetter, Rights to Remain Silent: Why Did rie Wbrhi Conference on luman Right5
Fail? And Does rite Clinton Administration Care?. VILLAGE VOICE. July 13. 1993. at 33 (discussing the
failure of the World Conference on Human Rights); Elaine Sciolino. US Rejects Notoin That Ihwian
Rights Vary with Culture, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al (labeling as "intense" the struggle between
western countries committed to universal human nghts and countnes that oppose the -imposition of
Western values").
117. A number of problems arise with reference to children, who arc mentioned at various places in
the present Draft Declaration and who are the subject of the widely ratified Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989). See Philip Alston. The Best hiterests Principle- Ton ariI/ a Reconciliation
of Culture and Human Rights, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD I (Philip Alston ed. 1994)
(examining the Convention's standard of "best interest of the child" as an example of the clash of cultures
and universal human rights standards); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0 Hafen, Abondoning Children to 77teir
Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on tire Righti of the Chld. 37 HARV INT'L L J 449 (1996)
(criticizing standards that emphasize children's autonomy rather than emphasizing the state's responsibility
to children).
118. See generally VALUING LOCAL KNOwLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ANt) INTELECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (Stephen B. Brush & Doreen Stabinsky eds. 1996) [hereinafter VALUING LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE] (considering such topics as indigenous rights to copyright arustic designs and the
safeguarding of religious practices from commercialization by outsiders) On the tssue of genetic resources.
see generally Stephen B. Brush, Whose Knowledge, Whose Genes. Whose Rights'. itt VALUING LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE, supra, at 1, which contemplates the compensation of indigenous people for the shanng of
their culture, knowledge, and biological resources; and Jonathan Fnedlaender, Genes. People. and Propert).
CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Summer 1996, at 22, which introduces a collection of essays on indigenous
peoples' rights to genetic information.
119. Cf. Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous People3. imi TRADITIONAL KNO\%,LEDGI- AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 52. 53-54 (Shelton H Davis & Katnna Ebbe eds. 1995) (discussing
protection of land rights). The general relation of indigenous peoples to their envtronment is taken up in
Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., U.N Doc A/CONF 151/26. 31 1 LM 814 (1992)
120. See I THE INDIGENOUS VOICE, supra note Il l. at 159-86 (analyzing the role of multinational
corporations and native reactions to their mining operations). ALVIN M JOSEPHY. JR. Now THAT THE
BUFFALO'S GONE 151-263 (1982) (describing private and governmental attacks on American Indian water.
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species for native religious rituals.1 2 1 Indeed, as one moves into the realm of
cultural differences-whether the question is one of access to sacred sites,
2
determining who may have a voice in speaking for an indigenous group,
2 3
or varying styles of criminal punishment'2-fundamental values may once
again come into irreconcilable conflict.
There have been, of course, a number of proposals for, and some
development of, international fora for the resolution of disputes involving
native peoples. Support exists for a permanent forum that would operate under
United Nations auspices,' 25 but the composition of such a panel and the
relative priority of native versus human rights and international customary law
standards remain to be addressed. Without overarching tribunals indigenous
peoples may remain subject to national policies and laws. With such tribunals
they may gain outside enforcement powers or simply lose out to the procedures
or criteria imposed by nations that wish to continue treating their native
peoples as an internal political matter.
In the end, it may seem churlish to suggest that international law is an
imperfect vehicle for the support of indigenous peoples' rights. After all, does
it not represent a clear attempt to help them? Are we not responding to their
expressed concerns when their representatives participate in the drafting of
conventions? And is the public discussion of such matters not a major
contributor to sensitizing-or at least embarrassing-recalcitrant governments?
Even if international law cannot "solve" the problems of native peoples, one
could argue that it helps to achieve a number of other desirable ends. When
categories emerge in international discussion-whether it be those of "women,"
"children," or "native peoples"--the members of a category acquire a presence,
fishing, and mineral resources); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992) (arguing that reform is needed to heal the breach between Indian
and non-Indian communities caused by laws allowing resource exploitation in the American West).
121. On the relation of treaty rights to endangered species legislation in the United States, see United
States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
122. See Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal Rights,
79 VA. L. REV. 691 (1993).
123. The issue of group identity arises in the American context as part of the Federal Acknowledgment
Project, see supra note 18, which allows previously unrecognized Indian tribes to enter into government-to-
government relations with the United States. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a) (1997). See generally Rachael Paschal,
Comment, The Imprimatur of Recognition: American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgment
Process, 66 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1991) (discussing the requirements and difficulties for tribes in gaining
recognition).
124. A tribal judge was criticized recently for punishing teenage tribal members found guilty of a
mugging by banishing them to a small island rather than sending them to jail, as state law would have
recommended. See Critics Contend Tribal Justice Was Easy on Young Muggers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. i1.
1995, at B12.
125. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 152. As Anaya notes:
The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, in its Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, called for a "permanent forum" for indigenous peoples within the United Nations
system, and the U.N. General Assembly responded by requesting the Commission on Human




even if they have yet to obtain decisive power. Indeed, when such individuals
or groups begin to see their own situation in terms of "rights," "integrity," or
"inviolability," they and their interlocutors may be launched on a new
discourse of great consequence.
Yet the very struggle for the terms of the discussion may, when played out
within the format of international conventions, mask the very weakness of
those affected. As the alternative draft proposal discussed above and the walk-
out of native representatives from the recent meeting of the Working Group
indicate, if the terms of such conventions remain too vague, if the criteria
continue to be drawn from the political cultures of former colonial powers, if
native groups do not have a vote on the drafted accords, and if the people
affected cannot see themselves in the language of the document, their
alternative vision may once again be submerged by those who profess to mean
them well. It is far from a rhetorical question to ask why a simple declaration
of self-determination for indigenous peoples by the international community
is not sufficient-and why most nation-states prefer a document of
innumerable articles susceptible to rather different readings.
IV. UNITY AND DIVERSITY REVISITED
The work of Kymlicka and Anaya underscores the allure and the pitfalls
of relying on a unified theory for addressing the concerns of indigenous
peoples. Kymlicka's unified approach fails to acknowledge the significant
distinction of native rights from those of minorities or ethnic groups by relying
on the nation as the indissoluble unit of political existence and on cultural
groups as existing solely for the development of the individual. t ' Anaya's
international law emphasis runs the same risk when it too accepts the nation
as the unit of analysis and places indigenous peoples in terms of that unit.
Thus, while such theories do separate indigenous from other group rights, they
inevitably blur the distinction with their sheer propulsion toward one theory
126. The high watermark of this emphasis on the nation in recent years was undoubtedly the Gulf
War, when President Bush refused to consider breaking up Iraq into Kurdish. Shinte. and Sunni portions
because doing so would set a precedent for the dissolution of nauon-states more widely See George Bush.
The Liberation of Kuwait Has Begun (Jan. 16, 1991), in THh GU- WAR R-.h iR 311-14 (Micah L Sifry
& Christopher Cerf eds.. 1991); see also BBC WORLD SERV. Guul- CRISIS CHRONOLOGY 204 (1991)
(noting President Bush's statement that "'the U S does not seek the destruction or destabiisation of Iraq")
The exception that proves this rule is clearly the former Yugoslavia. where only after the de fatcto
dissolution of the nation were western powers willing to sign on to the existence of separate entitics-and
then only because they feared that the spread of ethnic divisiveness might threaten nearby nations like
Greece. See LORING M. DANFORTH, THE MACEDONIAN CONFLICT (1995) (describing the role of
Macedonian identity across the frontiers of Greece, Yugoslavia. and the Balkans). MAYBURY-LEiWIS. supra
note 6, at 107-18 (summarizing the status of ethnic politics in the former Yugoslavia). Ivo John Lederer,
Bosnia: Precedents of Peace, WASH. POST, Dec. 17. 1995. at C'7 (analyzing the Dayton Accords and the
division of the former Yugoslavia). It is also worth recalling that the concept of the nation-state itself
imagined that minorities would be merged into the polity as a whole See Dankwarn A Rustow. Nanon.
in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7. 8 (David L Sills ed. 1968)
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covering all situations. The result is either to move, as Kymlicka does, to a
level of generality that makes specifics difficult to address, or, as Anaya does,
to leave out enforcement for nonstate solutions whenever the power of the state
against an internal group is irreconcilably posed. In both instances it is not so
much that misdirection occurs through a clearly fallacious theory as that a
more refined sense of other bases of knowledge and a genuine repertoire of
alternatives are set aside in the face of a one-size-fits-all orientation. It may be
possible, however, to construct a more elaborate or supplemental framework
for conceptualizing indigenous rights, emphasizing procedural approaches
suggested by the ethnographic knowledge of other cultures or elaborating
formats used to negotiate solutions to very particular disputes.
Such an elaborated set of alternative or supplementary propositions would
have two distinct advantages over a unitary approach: (1) It would permit us
to take a critical stance towards the established foundations of our theories and
to entertain new foundational concepts; and (2) it would give us a more
extended range of approaches with which to consider the particularities of
variant situations-to fashion, as it were, more tailored solutions than is
possible when one size must apply to every shape. Thus, international law
precepts may be exceedingly valuable for sensitizing powers to a common
language of obligation, but the appreciation of alternative legal forms may
represent a useful supplement to the inclusion of indigenous jurisprudence in
the family of laws entitled to comity. While individual choice may form one
basis for striking at group tyranny, the realization that choices are often
structured by group inclusion and cannot be forsaken except at great social and
psychological cost may help to validate the practices groups apply to those
who continue to be associated with them.
It is relatively easy, of course, to criticize Anaya and Kymlicka for their
proposals' lack of specificity, the vagueness of their terms, and the lack of
coherence among their competing rights formulations. But this criticism would,
to a considerable extent, be misplaced: One hardly needs to foresee all possible
occurrences or resolve all outstanding matters at once before the path of a
given approach can be commended. More important at this stage is the
establishment of some of the terms of the discussion itself. In particular, some
decision must be made about the distinctiveness of indigenous rights and the
role of history in separating indigenous rights from any others; about the extent
to which indigenous perspectives will really be brought to bear on the
discussions; and about the broader concepts of cultural change that existing
powers employ in their visions of native peoples in the modern world. As we
seek alternatives or additions to the classic foundations of liberal theory and
international law, we may wish to begin with some of the findings of modern
historical and social analysis.
History matters enormously to a consideration of native peoples' rights.
Kymlicka would support historic agreements with tribes that are not illiberal
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in order to build trust within a context of equality-based, group-differentiated,
self-governing entities. 127 Anaya, who is never quite direct about the role of
history, implies that precolonial affiliations should not take precedence over the
desires of contemporary populations." Neither author attends to the
distinctive history and changing policies upon which indigenous peoples have
been forced to rely and from which they cannot be extricated. It is not simply
a matter of historic injustice to say that local history cannot be ignored.'29
Rather, historic relations with indigenous peoples are unlike those involving
any others. Westerners' temptations to ignore history in the name of universal
justice or imagined predictability eventually will come up against unavoidable
historic particularities. 3 ' Useful analogies can certainly be constructed from
outside domains for application to indigenous rights, but principles and
procedures that fail to attend to history or cultural difference will only
perpetuate forced assimilation in the name of a higher law or philosophy.
The importance of history is intimately connected to a second issue,
namely consideration of the fundamentally different perspectives that many
native peoples hold in comparison to their neighbors. To the native of the
Americas for whom the concept of owning land is as unthinkable as owning
the air around one's head is to the average American, 3' or to the Aborigine
for whom throwing a spear at another may hold important cultural or religious
significance, 32  a covenant's promise to protect his people against
"ethnocide'3 3  may sound like yet another invitation for an outside forum to
set the terms of acceptable practices within the natives' own culture. With little
to insure that it is their understanding of the terms of a prior agreement that
will be given effect, 3  and with the experience of one recent case
127. See KYMucKA, supra note 7, at 116-20.
128. See ANAYA, supra note 9, at 84.
129. As Richard Falk has said in this context: "'WIc cannot approach the challenge of the relationship
with indigenous people as long as it remains an abstraction that can be lumped with other categories o!
injustice. Instead it has a specific history or series of histories, that is bound up with our modernizing,
developing civilization." Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), its THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17, 21 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
130. There has, for example, been enormous vanation in the terms of treaties, political policies, and
interracial relations affecting indigenous peoples. While general principles may serve as an overarching
context for cross-national relationships involving native peoples. approaches to such problems as economic
development of native resources must speak to local histories and local concerns- As Frank Pommersheim,
referring to economic programs in the Unites States, has said. "Each side [state and inbel has to see. or
at least explore, the potential for identifying local common ground on which to make a stand " FRANK
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AmERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTI'F-PORARY TRIBAL LIFE 161
(1995).
131. For native attitudes concerning the inalienability of land. see 2 THE INDIG.NOUS VOICE. supra
note 111, at 355-411.
132. See Regina v. Muddarubba, in CRIMINAL LAw 692 (Richard C Donnelly et al eds. 1962)
(printing an originally unpublished 1956 Australian opinion concernmg an Aborigine who speared a native
woman who called him by a term referring to his genitals)
133. E.g., 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98. at 66 ("Indigenous peoples have the collective
and individual right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide ')
134. The presumptions exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the interpretation of
treaties with Indians---that "'ambiguous expressions must be resolved in lavr of the Indian parties
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interpreting existing human rights conventions suggesting that collective
religious beliefs may be subject to the interpretations of nonbelievers,'35
much careful thought will have to be given to how the distinctiveness of
indigenous cultures will fare in the international environment. For all the
professions of concern for the preservation of native cultures, the language of
a unified theory of liberal rights and the language of international customary
law and global linkage cannot but lead many indigenous peoples to fear that
their distinctiveness will be subject to a new form of well-meaning assault.
Such a concern for retention of real differences leads to an additional
concern about international accords. As westerners think about indigenous
peoples, they may, with the best of intentions, tend to freeze such groups at a
particular moment in time or to create a climate in which certain "natural"
processes will not be disrupted by outside influences.1 36 References to the
insupportable destruction of indigenous peoples abound in the preambles to
national and international legislation.'3 7 So, too, there have been frequent
references to "development" and "progress" in documents concerning
indigenous peoples.'38 Perpetuation of such western conceptualizations can
easily serve as a new vocabulary of demonization. If Donald Trump disparages
Native Americans who run gambling casinos by saying that since they are
dressed in suits, rather than feathers, they do not look like Native Americans
to him, he clearly implies that the "special status" Native Americans have
under U.S. law constitutes an insupportable privilege. Neither the terms nor the
concerned, [that] Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have understood them,
and [that] Indian treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the Indians," Charles F. Wilkinson & John
M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water Flows, or Grass Grows
Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 617 (1975) (footnotes omitted)--are
concepts that neither the international covenants nor Kymlicka has considered. Compare the example of
the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, in which the question arises whether, by use of the word kawanatanga,
the Maori intended, as they now assert, to give to the whites only the powers of a "protectorate" or to cede
to the whites all of their "sovereignty," the term by which kawanatanga was translated into the English
version of the treaty. See J.G.A. POCOCK, LAW, SOVEREIGNTY AND HISTORY IN A DIVIDED CULTURE: TtlE
CASE OF NEW ZEALAND AND THE TREATY OF WAITANOI (1991).
135. See Khan v. Begum [1985] 3 S.C.R. 844 (India). Khan is discussed in Anika Rahman, Note,
Religious Rights Versus Women's Rights in India: A Test Case for International Human Rights Law, 28
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 477-79 (1990).
136. Anaya refers to a study of Native Hawaiian culture as arguing in favor of "the natural evolution
of Hawaiian culture cushioned from the onslaught of outside influences that have thus far had devastating
effects." ANAYA, supra note 9, at 110. The uncritical endorsement of ideas like the "natural evolution" of
a culture can, like earlier scientific and colonial doctrines, continue to create a climate of assumptions
capable of justifying policies quite harmful to native peoples.
137. See, e.g., International Indigenous Peoples Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 879, 101st Cong. § 2.
138. The preamble to the 1988 draft of the Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights used the
following phrase: "[clonsidering that all peoples and human groups have contributed to the progress of
civilizations and cultures which constitute the common heritage of humankind ...." 1988 DRArr
DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 32 (emphasis omitted). The reference to "progress" was subsequently
removed. See 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98. Nevertheless, the seemingly laudatory use of this
term, like the continuing reference to the "right to development in accordance with their own needs and
interests," 1993 DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 65, has a double-edged quality to it: It assumes
that "progress" or "development" is the norm, whereas native peoples may believe neither concept
represents their conception of the world.
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mentality of our philosophy or law, however, should allow non-natives to play
the role of "cultural game warden." The risk is that, for whatever motivating
reasons, the entire discourse of philosophy and international law as it relates
to indigenous peoples could replicate much of history by failing to
acknowledge these most fundamental problems of attitude and perception on
the part of non-native peoples. It is here that some of the findings of modem
social science may be of assistance.
Social science research has, on occasion, contributed markedly to policy
approaches. Within the field of anthropology, for example, comparative studies
have clearly demonstrated that there is no correlation between race and
intelligence, complexity of social forms, or subtlety of cultural constructs.'39
When the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson'" was being
challenged, such findings were indispensable to undercutting the claims of
"scientific racism."' 4 ' While findings about the nature of cultural patterns
may not lead ineluctably to specific policy conclusions, they may, at the very
least, point to some implications for society as a whole of applying one or
another particular public policy. Consider, in this context, the implications for
indigenous peoples' rights of what we know about human rationality, the role
of history in nonliterate societies, and the social organization of other cultures.
For some time there has been a concern in anthropology about whether
people in different cultures reason in fundamentally different ways.' "2 If
different languages and systems of cultural symbols express or encode
experience through categorically different modes of reasoning, translation
among cultures and the quest for certain universals may face an almost
insuperable barrier. The clear weight of evidence, however, is to the contrary.
Notwithstanding quite different subjects and resultant patterns, there is no
reason to believe that people differ in their fundamental capacity for rational
thought.'4 3 Indeed, the issue is no longer whether others are as rational but
rather hinges upon two more subtle points: (1) that given a common base to
human rational thought, translation among cultures is indeed possible,
139. For examples of these studies, see ASHLEY MONTAOU. MAN'S MOST DA.NGEROt;S MYTH THE
FALLACY OF RACE (Oxford Univ. Press 1974) (1942). and ASHLEY MONTAGU. STATOMENT ON RACE
(Oxford Univ. Press 1972) (1951).
140. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
141. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 264-66 (1976). 3ee abo 2 RoBERT Rhi-IELD. THE
SOCIAL USES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 187-88 (Margaret Park Redfield ed. 1963) (explaining the author's role
as an expert witness in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U S 629 (1950). a predecessor of Brown v Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropologit a3 Expert Wtnes. 79 Am
ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 557-62 (1977) (detailing the testimony of anthropologists in cases associated ,th
Brown).
142. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD (1997) (emphasing the universal validity o1 reasoning),
RATIONALITY (Bryan R. Wilson ed., 1979); MARSHALL SAHLINS. How "NATivES' THINK 157-66 (1995).
Richard A. Shweder, Anthropology's Romntic Rebellion Againot the Enhghtenment. or 77iere's More to
Thinking titan Reason and Evidence, in CULTURE THEORY 27 (Richard A Shwcder & Roben A Levine
eds., 1987).
143. See sources cited supra note 142.
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notwithstanding the different resonances each language carries; and (2) that
alternative systems of thought may serve to enrich one another as encounters
increase and changing circumstances pose new problems. If, for example, one
traces a chain of causality at all points to human agency, as many cultures do,
one's view of ecological responsibility may be quite different than if one
assumes that physical processes can lead "accidentally" to physical results.
Similarly, another culture's giving prominence to techniques for assessing
character over ways of assessing "facts" may challenge us to rethink our own
culture and law's bases for interpersonal perception and the treatment of
cultural minorities.
This form of the rationality argument thus provides some justification for
allowing the courts of indigenous peoples to develop, provided those councils
articulate the reasons for their decisions." Just as the Administrative
Procedure Act 4 5 revolutionized administrative law by requiring bureaucrats
to give reasons for their actions 46 -reasons that could then be subject to
inspection-so, too, by recognizing the commonly based rationality of
indigenous decisionmakers and affording them the opportunity to explain their
judgments, native approaches could be included within the growing body of
international custom and human rights discourse. Whether in appellate review
by an international forum or simply by incorporation in collections of the
opinions of native tribunals, indigenous law would be accorded the opportunity
to present itself as no less rational than the judgments of other cultures.
Thus, an indigenous group may rationally calculate that the orderliness of
the universe on its view may be irreparably harmed by dividing power between
secular and sacred figures. Westerners may view this division of power as
enhancing individual choice; from the indigenous perspective, however, the
division actually limits choice, by precluding that unitary world through which
the full range of human possibilities is alone rendered practicable. Whether it
is accusations of witchcraft, which are made of almost everyone at some time
and carry neither criminal penalty nor personal stigma but serve to level status
differences and redistribute wealth to the injured,'47 or an incest boundary
that encourages group alliances at the expense of choices permitted under state
statutes, 48 the practices of native peoples are not without rational
foundations. To see such beliefs and practices as no less capable of
144. For a recent argument in favor of expanding the role of tribal courts in the Native American
context, see POMMERSHEIM, supra note 130, at 57-59, 66-79.
145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
146. See U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 555(e), 557(c).
147. See E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, WITCHCRAFr, ORACLES AND MAGIC AMONO THE AZANDE 63-83
(1937); ROBIN Fox, Pueblo Baseball: A New Use for Old Witchcraft, in ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY
182 (1968).
148. See DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1968) (explaining that
cousin marriage, even where permissible by law, may be discouraged in the American kinship system).
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communication and rational appraisal is to take a very significant step toward
the recognition and respect necessary for mutual understanding and negotiation.
Similarly, we now know that the image of native communities as "'peoples
without a history" is quite false. Even where social structures, like the rules of
chess, may not have undergone frequent alteration, we know that the
arrangements, the styles, the moves vary in any culture.' The implication
for indigenous rights may be, as we have seen, that no national or international
policy should seek to fix native cultures at a given moment or in a given form.
Policies based on the preservation of "timeless peoples" in timeless states
should be opposed for their fallacious assumptions about the history of such
groups. Oral history may then be accorded appropriate weight in establishing
the identity or claims of native peoples. As a result, the question of when
assimilation has erased indigenous identity may be addressed with greater
sophistication if one sees that the adjustments made to the contact situation,
embodied in oral history, often involve giving indigenous meaning to outside
cultural forms. Such adaptation is necessary for a group to continue the social
relations formerly expressed in a native ritual. Similarly, prohibitions against
"ethnocide" may need to distinguish carefully between government programs
aimed at the eradication of languages or customs and those that seek to freeze
native cultures in a form acceptable to the interests of government or business.
The appropriation by non-natives of the imagined ecological superiority of
native peoples is not only historically misleading, but also may serve to justify
policies that force natives to choose between specific types of economic
development and maintaining their legal protections as native peoples. If
anthropologists are correct in having shown that societies always have
structural forms, does that not also suggest that native groups should be
permitted to develop their own approaches to the contact situation? Denying
that native peoples have histories robs them of their past; denying their past
robs them of a future of their own creation.
It is also possible to fashion alternative procedures for the relation of
indigenous peoples to the surrounding state without resorting to a unified
philosophy or international convention, alternatives mentioned but not fully
explored, by both Kymlicka and Anaya. For example, a number of Native
American tribes have entered into agreements with states for the purposes of
determining jurisdiction or regulatory controls.' Some of these compacts,
149. See, e.g., CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A READER IN CONTB.IPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (Nicholas
B. Dirks et al. eds., 1993) (demonstrating that historical "texts" need to include sources beyond the
documentary); RENATO ROSALDO, ILONGOT HEADIUNTING. 1883-1974 A STUDY IN SoCIETY AND
HISTORY (1980) (showing how the history of a nonhiterate group is undergoing constant change, as
represented in oral sources); ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE ANt) THE PEoPLE WThOt.T HISTORY (1982)
(demonstrating that, when the voice of "the people without history" is properly considered, their
contribution to changing world history alters one's view of that history)
150. Some of these compacts involve transnational agreements, as in the case ol lishing agreements
entered into among tribes, states, the U.S. government, and the government of Canada See GhTcslhs T
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as they are called in the United States, involve cross-deputization of tribal and
state police officers,15' while others concern the joint exploitation of limited
resources, such as fish or game that cross borders. 52 Other compacts could
address outstanding matters of civil jurisdiction, conflicts of laws, or
enforcement of one another's judgments. Compacts have the obvious advantage
of all agreements: Through free entry, parties are more likely to adhere to their
terms, to exchange ideas through the negotiation process, and to go beyond the
formal terms as mutual interests are expressed and mutual flexibility
appreciated. An agreement to allow the "hot-pursuit" of a drunken driver
across a border, for example, may increase overall law enforcement in sparsely
settled areas as well as encourage the flexible use of social sanctions that hold
different meanings in different cultures. More broadly, by creating a special
category in international law for such compacts and coupling them with the
enforcement powers of an appropriate forum, one could encourage both
negotiation and the recognition of each party's state-like qualities in certain
contexts.
Similarly, the concept of "contractual sovereignty"'153 could serve as a
substitute or supplement to any renewal of treaty negotiations. 154 Just as
nation-states like Sikkim, Monaco, and the Vatican have agreements by which
their defense or foreign policy is contractually assigned to another state,
155
so, too, encouragement could be given through international agencies to the
apportionment of some sovereign powers among indigenous groups and
surrounding states. Such a concept would simultaneously recognize sovereign
powers previously unacknowledged and help formulate a recognized repertoire
of possibilities through which the process of negotiation might be more fairly
balanced. International oversight of agreements involving developers who
contract with indigenous groups for the latter's intellectual property also could
operate through recognized special-purpose categories and fora: Royalties for
native medicinal plants or folk designs used in western decorations and
clothing could be based on concepts of contractual sovereignty rather than the
copyright laws of a particular nation. For nations concerned about security and
the cross-border activities of indigenous groups, contractual sovereignty also
AL., supra note 94, at 858. Other compacts clarify the tax status of a tribe within a state, thus enabling a
tribe to issue bonds. See Leon E. Wynter, Business and Race, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1997, at B I. Perhaps
most significantly, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994), specifies that a tribal-state pact will serve as the basis for regulatory control of particular classes
of casino games. For additional examples of tribal-state agreements, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 218 n.156 (1987).
151. Cf POMMERSHEIM, supra note 130, at 79-90, 153-61 (emphasizing issues of state-tribal comity
and negotiated sovereignty accords).
152. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 94, at 858-60,
153. "Contractual sovereignty" is the apportionment of some sovereignty to indigenous groups through
a contractual arrangement with the states in which they reside.
154. See VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 161-86 (First Univ. of Tex.
Press 1985) (1974).
155. See id. at 176-78.
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could form the basis for negotiating free movements by natives, on the one
hand, and control of incursions by inhabitants of bordering states, on the other.
Issues of indigenous intellectual property could be shaped by forms of
agreement developed by consultation among representatives of indigenous and
state governments. The formulation of an array of recognizable accords could
preserve the particularity of each situation while generating international
support for legitimizing various types of agreements. Such an approach also
may encourage the insertion of indigenous concepts into the developing realm
of international customary law.
There even may be instances in some countries where indigenous peoples
could organize as different types of entities for different purposes-as a
religion, a registered voluntary association, or a profession-each type of
activity linking them to the special protection accorded similarly situated
entities, without costing them the option of being identified in other ways in
still different contexts. Thus, protection for sacred sites could be linked to
similar protection accorded other religions under national law, while
jurisdictional powers could remain completely separate; alternatively, some
aspects of membership and property rights could be governed by the laws of
association. The advantage would be as much attitudinal as political: The right
of indigenous peoples to distinct identities should not be at risk when they
appear to "assimilate" with respect to particular issues. Such a realization
would go a long way toward undercutting the tendency in any unified theory
to eradicate difference once distinction in any domain is altered.
If indigenous peoples are not to have a full measure of independence, the
question arises whether their special situation nevertheless argues for separate
representation in local or national legislative bodies. Indeed, there may be
circumstances in which an individual wishes to opt out of his or her political
status as a "native" without losing all benefits accorded individuals who choose
to be subject to native jurisdiction. International conventions or international
customary law may need to speak to these issues. The special representation
granted Maori in the New Zealand legislature,'56 for example, may constitute
a model to be supported by international custom, particularly when, as in the
Maori situation, natives constitute a significant proportion of the national
population. In such a case, alliances formed with non-natives to help achieve
their goals may, in turn, result in greater attention to native needs. In other
situations, the publicity value of native representatives speaking with full
immunity from the floor of the legislature may bring their situation to the
attention of the public at large. State guarantees for individuals who wish to
leave their groups may also require international guarantees if an individual
subject to cultural discrimination by her group is to have a realistic alternative
status available. Increased guarantees for a specific right of consent to matters
156. See KYmucKA, supra note 7. at 147-49
1997]
The Yale Law Journal
affecting jurisdiction, particularly in civil matters and misdemeanors, would go
a long way toward creating government-to-government cooperation among
indigenous groups and their surrounding nations.
Such measures have the advantage lost by comprehensive approaches,
whether of liberal theory or international law alone, which cannot respond to
the quite widely varied situations and histories of native peoples. Seen as a
repertoire rather than as exemplifications of a unitary approach, the array of
options suggested can be fashioned to the circumstances in ways that avert the
hurdles placed before unified theories: Specificity can emerge from broad
propositions grounded in local agreements; cross-national criteria can develop
that relate to processes; and units of analysis-person, tribe, peoples-can
become more substantive based on the distinctive local histories of native/non-
native relations. The result will be a synoptic view of indigenous rights, a view
of instances out of which arises a sense of themes and variations by which the
distinctiveness of indigenous lives-for so long occluded by philosophies and
policies that perpetuate national interests in the name of general laws-will
retain their own shape and voice.
The acceptability of alternatives, whether as an array of recognizable
possibilities at the international level or as options for the reformulation of
national policies, ultimately depends on the answer to one simple question:
How much difference are non-native peoples and governments prepared to
accept? I put the matter this way, emphasizing the non-natives, because
without the concurrence of those non-native peoples who hold most power
little may be expected to change. One may not be able to legislate a change
of attitude, but as the terms of the discussion are changed, whether by
capturing the philosophical underpinnings or through the articulation of
international accords,157 it becomes possible to see that, ironically, a diverse
set of mechanisms offers the best hope for the development of a coherent
approach to indigenous rights. The ambivalence felt toward native peoples in
many nations affords an opportunity to move away from singular "solutions"
to "the native problem" and toward the unity of diverse approaches.
The starting point comes in the reimagination of indigenous peoples and
the consequent reconfiguration of our policies. Such representations have arisen
at times out of westerners' own ideals-as when Iroquois chiefs in the
eighteenth century were portrayed in toga-like robes and convened like a
republican senate for their own governance,'58 or, more recently, when a
Native American was pictured in an ecology poster as so perfectly in tune with
157. The Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples makes such a change in the terms of
discussion when it emphasizes indigenous peoples' "right to be different" in speaking in its opening of "the
right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such." 1993
DRAFT DECLARATION, supra note 98, at 65.
158. See JOSEPH LAF1TAU, MOEURS DES SAVAGES AMERIQUAINS (1724) (photograph, reprint on file
with the Yale Law Journal).
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the land that a tear could roll down his cheek at the prospect of continuing
ecological harm.1 59 Even when others portray native peoples in a positive
light, the tendency may remain to ignore their "differentness" in the name of
a common identity. If non-natives can resist the urge to stereotype natives or
to render them identical to themselves we may be able to avoid the application
of philosophical or legal paradigms that assume justice and difference to be
incompatible. Only by the true acceptance of genuine difference will those who
benefit from the existing distribution of power begin to see the full array of
possibilities that are available to us all. Only by embracing inescapable
difference, rather than seeking to disguise it under well-intentioned generalities,
may a unified theory of policy or law, such as those sought by Kymlicka and
Anaya, contribute to the overall goal (to borrow a phrase) of making every
nation "safe for diversity."'
' 60
159. See ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN Plate 11 (1978) On the changing
image of the American Indian, see also DRESSING IN FFATHERS. THI CONSTRUCTION 01 Ti INDIAN IN
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE (S. Elizabeth Bird ed.. 1996). and ROY HARVEY P,,RCI. SAVAGIS.t AND
CIVILIZATION: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1988) Cf Michel J Yburra. A
Monument Caught in the Middle, N.Y. TIES, May 7, 1996. at AI4 (describing a disputc over a statuc in
San Francisco representing conquered Indians) On the use of Naiive Americans in ,adverlisng spcalically.
see Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Repreaentng Craz) Horse. 27 Co.i, L Rbv
1003 (1995).
160. David M. Shribman, From Our Past: A Way to Glory. BOSTON GLOBF. July 4. 1997. at A3
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